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ABSTRACT
Some social networks provide explicit mechanisms to allocate social
rewards such as reputation based on users’ actions, while the mech-
anism is more opaque in other networks. Nonetheless, there are
always individuals who obtain greater rewards and reputation than
their peers. An intuitive yet important question to ask is whether
these successful users employ strategic behaviors to become influ-
ential. It might appear that the influencers "have gamed the system."
However, it remains difficult to conclude the rationality of their
actions due to factors like the combinatorial strategy space, inability
to determine payoffs, and resource limitations faced by individuals.
The challenging nature of this question has drawn attention from
both the theory and data mining communities. Therefore, in this
paper, we are motivated to investigate if resource-limited individu-
als discover strategic behaviors associated with high payoffs when
producing collaborative/interactive content in social networks. We
propose a novel framework of Dynamic Dual Attention Networks
(DDAN) which models individuals’ content production strategies
through a generative process, under the influence of social inter-
actions involved in the process. Extensive experimental results
illustrate the model’s effectiveness in user behavior modeling. We
make three strong empirical findings: (1) Different strategies give
rise to different social payoffs; (2) The best performing individuals
exhibit stability in their preference over the discovered strategies,
which indicates the emergence of strategic behavior; and (3) The
stability of a user’s preference is correlated with high payoffs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper examines if individuals can successfully discover strate-
gies with high payoffs in social networks. In seminal work, Simon
[32] introduced the idea of bounded rationality—that human be-
ings use limited resources to make decisions. In more recent work,
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Gigerenzer et al. [9, 10] argued that human beings used heuristics
to make decisions whose quality matched that of rational agents.
Online social networks typically have an explicit mechanism that
allocates rewards (usually points) that vary with users’ behaviors;
for example, the right answer on a community question-answer
website like StackOverflow (https://www.stackoverflow.com) may
earn the individual who posted the answer reputation points.
In some other networks, the mechanism is more opaque. For
example, on Twitter, the inclusion of a celebrity’s twitter handle on
your tweet causes your tweet to appear on their timeline, increasing
your visibility. Perhaps over time, this improved visibility results
in one having more followers, and that increased visibility may
cause one to become an influencer—advertisers may reach out to
market their products. In a different example, an assistant professor
needs to decide where she should publish her current work. Should
she submit the paper to a high prestige conference with a lower
probability of acceptance or a lower-tier conference with a higher
probability? The former strategy yields greater visibility, but with a
lower acceptance rate. If the conference rejects her paper, she may
need to wait out a year. Some individuals on websites with explicit
mechanisms have many reputation points; others in networks such
as Twitter, are influencers—did these individuals employ strategic
behaviors to gain points or to become influential?
At first glance, it might appear that individuals who do well,
“have gamed the system” as it were, and the rest have not figured out
the mechanism. However, for games with opaque mechanisms, the
strategy space is unclear; and for games with explicit mechanisms
(e.g., StackOverflow), the payoffs for a particular action are still
unknown. It is not straightforward to conclude that the winners
of these social networks (e.g., influencers on Twitter) are rational
in the classic sense (i.e., maximize expected utility) due to several
reasons. The combinatorial strategy space (e.g., on StackOverflow,
which question to answer, when, answer length, readability, etc.);
the inability to determine the payoffs (e.g., reputation points) for any
given strategy; and the fact that individuals do not have unlimited
resources to determine their best response. Instead, the best we can
conclude is that the best players are differentially rational—that is,
when compared to their peers, they have a better understanding of
the correlation between a strategy and its payoff.
The theoretical Computer Science community has paid attention
to games of incomplete information [7, 12, 20] with dynamic popu-
lations (as in behavior in online auctions). For example, a key result
from Lykouris et al. [20] is that when agents play repeated games
with strategies that guarantee low-adaptive regret, high social wel-
fare is ensured. One of the challenges with theoretical work is that
it is unclear if, in practice, individuals can find successful strategies.
Most existing social modeling tasks target on discovering people’s
interests from textual contents on social media [3, 19, 27, 48] or
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
03
67
0v
2 
 [c
s.S
I] 
 13
 M
ar 
20
20
WWW ’20, April 20–24, 2020, Taipei, Taiwan Y. Xiao et al.
tracing the propagation of social influence along social networks
[2, 25, 35]. A few do consider the latent strategies adopted by people
in social networks; however, they either ignore contextual informa-
tion [5], or do not further examine the impact of those strategies
[44]. Thus we are motivated to ask a simple question:
Can individuals with limited resources discover con-
tent production strategies with high payoffs in social
networks?
To operationalize our question, we analyze the preference order
over strategies. In particular, we ask two questions: first, does the
preference order among strategies for authors stabilize over time,
indicating the emergence of strategic behavior? Second, if the pref-
erence order is stable, does the preference order maximize utility?
Notice that preference order stability does not imply high payoffs;
the stability may arise due to other factors such as social norms.
We wish to answer this question through an analysis of empirical
data from a social network. An empirical analysis is non-trivial:
while we may observe a particular outcome (e.g., which paper to
cite; which celebrity’s handle to mention; the topic of the message
that we post on social media), as well as be able to compute the
reward, we do not observe the strategic considerations underlying
the action.
Our technical insight: to model the observed behavior as a gen-
erative process. That is, a strategic decision changes the posterior
distribution over the action space. We assume that while the set of
strategies is common to all, each individual adopts a mixed-strategy
over the set of different strategies. In other words, the distribution
over the set of strategies is private to each individual. To model
individual behavior, we propose conceptualizing content produc-
tion as a bipartite graph where the nodes include individuals and
contents, and where content may have multiple authors. Thus, the
strategy to produce a piece of content (e.g., author a paper in an
academic social network, post blogs online) depends on the strat-
egy distributions of its authors; and the co-authors may influence
the strategy distribution of an author. We identify an elegant dual
attention neural architecture motivated by Veličković et al. [40] to
model individual behavior. Then, we compare our results with a
counterfactual condition: the inferred strategic behavior of an ide-
alized expected-utility maximizer. We summarize our contributions
as follows:
Coupling authors and content: Wepropose a novel Dynamic
Dual Attention Network (DDAN) to jointly model the role
of the authors in the determination of content production
strategy, and how co-authoring content influences authors’
content production strategy. The DDAN helps discover the
author’s strategy. In contrast, past works either focus on the-
oretical concepts (e.g., [12, 20]) or do not attempt to identify
strategic behaviors from data. In the dynamic dual attention
mechanism, the content strategy depends on the strategies
of all of its authors. Conversely, the strategy of an author
depends on her prior production strategy as well as the strate-
gies of all the content that she played a role in producing at
the current moment. Extensive experiments show that our
framework models user behaviors well.
Strong experimental findings: We have strong qualitative
findings. First, we show that different strategies result in
a1
AUTHOR CONTENT
c1
Attribute 1
a2
a3
a4
a5
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
Attribute 2
Attribute 3
Attribute 4
Attribute 5
(a) (b)
Figure 1: (a) Authors and contents form a bipartite graph
where the edges between them indicating that a group of au-
thors work together to produce contents. (b) Each content
has multiple attributes, including but not limited to, time
and venue of publication, textual topic, and links to other
entities.
different payoffs. Second, we show through rank correlation,
that the authors with the top 10% normalized utility exhibit
stability in their preference orders. Furthermore, a majority
of authors do not discover the correlation between strategies
and payoffs. Third, we show that the stability of preference
is correlated with high payoffs.
The significance of this work: to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first attempt to identify strategic behaviors from empirical
data formally. We organize the rest of the paper as follows. In the
next section, we introduce the problem. In Section 3, we show how
to model strategic behavior, including identifying our assumptions,
and introducing our Dynamic Dual Attention Network formalism.
In Section 4, we propose a model for rational behavior, to serve as
an idealized baseline. Then, in Section 5, we present experiments
on an academic dataset, including specification of the strategic
space. Section 6 highlights the qualitative findings. Then, we discuss
challenges and limitations in Section 7 followed by a discussion of
related work in Section 8. We conclude in Section 9.
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
We first present an informal description before presenting the prob-
lem in detail.
2.1 Informal Problem Description
Consider a general scenario, where a set of individuals A work
together to author a piece of content c . This content could be a blog
post, an academic paper, or when a group attempts to answer a
question on a community question-answer forum such as Stack-
Exchange. We can associate attributes with the created content c ,
including venue of publication; time of publication; content topic;
links to other entities including contents (e.g., citations to other
academic papers, links to other blog posts) and authors (e.g., tweets
can include mentions of other individuals on Twitter).
We can associate a time-varying utility µc (k) to each content c
published at time t , where we evaluate the utility after k time units
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(i.e., at time t + k): academic papers receive citations; blog posts
receive in-links; answers on a community question answer forum
receive up or down votes (the forum will transform the votes to
reputation points). In general, the relationship between a particular
choice of attributes for the content (e.g., topic) and its utility is
non-trivial to assess. Not only is the relationship non-deterministic,
but also, the payoffs are distant.
Authors have to make decisions about content attributes, includ-
ing, for example, the topic, the publication venue, links to other
entities. We identify four challenges. First, the attribute cardinality
is large. For example, for an author to identify a paper to cite, she
needs to consider the entire set of past published papers. Instead,
she may have private strategies, including picking papers that are
highly cited, to bias her attribute selection. Second, the mapping
between attribute choice and utility is non-deterministic, with a
distant payoff. Third, while she can observe the choice of attributes
(e.g., content topic), made by her peers, and their payoffs (e.g., ci-
tations), she cannot observe the strategic consideration behind that
choice. Finally, authors are resource-limited (e.g., limited time, at-
tention), limiting their ability to determine co-variation between
their choices and payoffs. Thus, we can ask:
Are resource-limited individuals in social networks
able to discover content-production strategies that
yield high payoffs?
2.2 Data Model
Now, we develop the data model for the problem. Let A denote
the set of individuals who produce content on a social network,
and let C denote the set of content. Authors may either collaborate
or work alone to author content c ∈ C. Thus, we can construct
an undirected bipartite graph Ga,c = (V, E), whereV = A ∪ C,
E = {(a, c) | a ∈ A, c ∈ C, a is an author of c}, to compactly
represent content production (Figure 1 (a)). Figure 1 (b) illustrates
that each content c ∈ C may have multiple attributes.
The author picks the attribute values strategically. Let every
author use the same strategy space S, where |S| = m. However,
each author randomizes over them strategies independently. That
is, for each author a, we associate a probability distribution Da
over them strategies, private to each individual, from which she
draws her strategy to determine the attributes for c . For example, if
an author wishes to determine which papers to cite, her strategies
could include picking papers uniformly at random from past papers,
as well as picking papers based on citation count. More formally,
each choice of strategy S ∈ S affects the posterior distribution of
attribute values. When a group of authors collaborate, we assume
that they negotiate and develop a consensus strategy. We use Da (t)
to represent a’s strategy distribution at time t . We assume that the
author’s past strategy Da (t − 1) and her co-authors’ strategy at
time t influence Da (t).
Assume that a content c authored by a at time t receives a utility
µc (k) after k time units. In general, at time t , an author a creates a
set of content Ca (t). Some content c ∈ Ca (t) may have co-authors.
Thus the total utility for author a for authoring these contents Ca (t)
at time t , k time units after publication, is:
µa (t ,k) =
∑
c ∈Ca (t )
µc (k) · r (a | c), (1)
Notation Description
G(t) Snapshot of the author-content graph at time t
Ca (t) Set of contents created by a at time t
A˜ ′(t) Set of authors with over 5 active contents at time t
ha (t) Embedding vector of a at time t
Fa (t) Field vector of a at time t
Da (t) Strategy distribution of a at time t
r (a | c) a’s contribution to c’s strategy distribution
µa (t ,k) Utility received by a with Da (t) over k time units
µˆa (t − k) Normalized total utility received by a with Da (t − k)
µ¯д(t , S) The global expected normalized utility for strategy S
Table 1: Notation table.
where, r (a | c) ∈ [0, 1] is the attribution of authora’s role in creating
content c . Notice for each c ∈ Ca (t), the co-author group may be
different. Each author a has a private preference between a pair
of strategies Si , Sj . We denote Si ≻a Sj (or Si dominates Sj ) if the
probability of picking Si is greater than Sj and Si ∼a Sj if a is
indifferent between the two. We ask two questions:
First, does the preference order among strategies for
authors stabilize over time, indicating the emergence
of strategic behaviors? Second, if the preference order
is stable, does the preference order maximize utility?
Notice that the emergence of stable preferences by itself does not
imply that the author is maximizing utility, since social norms may
cause preference stability. We will compare the strategic behaviors
of social network participants against myopic rational agents that
maximize expected utility.
3 MODELING STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR
To identify strategic behavior for content production, we need to
address two questions. First, how to determine the strategy dis-
tribution Dc for content c , jointly authored by a set of authors
Ac . Notice that each author a ∈ Ac has an individual strategy
distribution Da (t). Second, we need to determine how the prior
strategy distribution Da (t − 1) and the strategy distributions of the
co-authors of a influence the strategy distribution Da (t).
Next, we introduce key modeling assumptions followed by an
elegant Dynamic Dual Attention Network (DDAN) to jointly solve
both questions.
3.1 Assumptions
Now we discuss assumptions useful for developing our model.
Strategy distributions: We associate a strategy distribution
Dc with content c produced at time t . Dc depends on the
individual strategy distributions Da (t) of the set of authors
Ac who jointly produce c . In other words, the set of au-
thors Ac draw the strategy Si ∈ S given Dc to determine
attributes for c . Assume that an author a participates in the
production of a set of contents Ca (t). We assume that two
factors influence her strategy distribution Da (t): her prior
strategy distribution Da (t − 1); the strategy distribution of
her co-authors for each c ∈ Ca (t).
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Utility calculation: Let µc (k) be the utility accumulated by
content c after k time units. Since each author a ∈ Ac
contributes to a different extent to produce c , we assume
that the utility that flows back to a is in proportion to her
contribution. That is, the utility µa |c (k) ∝ µc (k) · r (a | c),
where µa |c (k) is the utility that flows back to a after k time
units in proportion to her contribution r (a | c). Notice that∑
a r (a | c) = 1,a ∈ Ac .
Vertex representation: We associate each content c with a
node embedding vector hc ∈ RF and each author a at time t
with a node embedding vector ha (t) ∈ RF (e.g., ESim [31]).
We obtain a time-dependent embedding vector for an author,
by treating the same author at different times as separate
nodes when embedding the network.
Network snapshots: Since the graph G = (V, E) grows over
time, we divide the graph into snapshots. Specifically, we
define the vertex setV(t) and the edge set E(t) for the graph
G(t) to include the authors active at time t , the contents
created at time t , and the links from the content created at
time t with their attributes. If an author appears for the first
time in snapshot t , we draw the prior strategy distributions
Da (t −1) from a flat Dirichlet distribution and use an all zero
vector as the prior embedding ha (t − 1).
3.2 Dynamic Dual Attention Networks
We propose a novel Dynamic Dual Attention Network (DDAN),
inspired by the work on Graph Attention Networks by Veličković
et al. [40], to identify the strategy distributions for content and its
authors. The DDAN elegantly addresses the two central dependen-
cies: the strategy for the production of any content depends on the
strategies of its authors, and an author’s prior strategy as well as
her co-authors influence her current strategic behavior. We jointly
optimize two attention mechanisms.
3.2.1 Determining the strategy for the production of a single content.
The strategy distribution Dc of a content c created at time t is
affected by the strategy distribution Da (t) of all its authors a ∈ Ac .
To determine the contribution αa |c of a specific author a towards
Dc , we feed the embedding vector of the content c (i.e., hc ) and
of the author a at time t (i.e., ha (t)) into a one-layer attention
mechanism as follows:
ea |c = σ
(
ϕ⊤c,a ·
[
Wc,ahc | |Wc,aha (t)
] )
, (2)
αa |c = softmaxa (ea |c ) =
exp(ea |c )∑
a′∈Ac exp(ea′ |c )
, (3)
whereWc,a ∈ RF ′×F is a shared linear transformation and ϕc,a ∈
R2F
′ is the weight vector in a one-layer feedforward neural network.
Note that | | is the concatenation operator to concatenate two vectors
and we use LeakyReLU for the nonlinearity σ . We use softmax
normalization to ensure that the contributions of all the coauthors
to a particular content sum to 1. Finally, note that since αa |c is a’s
contribution to the determination of Dc , we set r (a | c) = αa |c .
Then the strategy distribution Dc of content c is the sum of its
authors’ strategy distributions Da (t) at time t , weighted by each
authors a’s contribution αa |c . We use ξ to represent tanh nonlinear
activation. We use L1 normalization to ensure that Dc is a valid
strategy distribution:
Dc = ξ
©­«
∑
a∈Ac
αa |c · Da (t)ª®¬ . (4)
3.2.2 Determining an author’s strategy. An author’s strategy Da (t)
depends on the strategy adopted for each content she authors at
time t as well as her past strategy distribution Da (t − 1). First, we
examine the effect of the strategy for the production of content c
where she is a co-author in Ac .
We apply an attention mechanism to learn content c’s contribu-
tion αc |a on author a’s strategy distribution Da (t) as follows:
ec |a = σ
(
ϕ⊤a,c ·
[
Wa,cha (t) | |Wa,chc
] )
, (5)
αc |a = softmaxc (ec |a ) =
exp(ec |a )∑
c ′∈Ca (t ) exp(ec ′ |a )
. (6)
We use a different attention mechanism to determine the con-
tribution of a’s strategy distribution at time t − 1 on her current
strategy distribution:
βa (t) = sigmoid
(
ϕ⊤a,a ·
[
Wa,aha (t) | |Wa,aha (t − 1)
] )
. (7)
Thus, a’s strategy distribution Da (t) at time t is the weighted
sum of the strategy distribution Dc for c ∈ Ca (t), and Da (t − 1):
Da (t) = ξ ©­«βa (t)Da (t − 1) + (1 − βa (t))
∑
c ∈Ca (t )
αc |a · Dcª®¬ . (8)
We use L1 normalization to ensure that Da (t) is a valid distribution.
In this section, we discussed modeling assumptions and showed
how to determine the content production strategy as a function of
the author strategies as well as how past author strategy Da (t − 1)
and co-author strategies influence an author’s current strategy
Da (t). Next, we show how to model a rational agent that maximizes
expected utility.
4 A MODEL FOR RATIONAL BEHAVIOR
Rational behavior is a useful baseline to understand better the be-
haviors that we discover in this paper. An author engaged in rational
behavior would be able to evaluate the utilities of all strategies and
be able to identify the optimal strategy. However, determining ra-
tional behavior is hard for several reasons. First, notice that while
the actions (e.g., the paper that author cites; content topic) are ob-
servable, the strategies that result in the actions (e.g., pick highly cited
papers to cite) are not observable. This means that any author with
access to unlimited resources, who wishes to engage in rational
play, will need to develop a model of user behavior that connects
strategies to outcomes, fit the model, and then connect strategy dis-
tributions Da to payoffs. Unsurprisingly, we could develop several
plausible rational models, and below, we discuss one such model
that utilizes our DDAN framework.
First, we ask: given the utility at time t of content co-authored
by a at time t − k , what is the utility of author a using strategies
distribution Da (t −k)? We compute a normalized utility as follows:
µˆa (t − k) = 1
k︸︷︷︸
time
×
∑
c ∈Ca (t−k ) µa |c (t − k)
|Ca (t − k)|︸       ︷︷       ︸
count
, (9)
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The equation says that the normalized utility µˆa (t − k) due to
the distribution Da (t −k) depends on the relative utility µa |c (t −k)
accruing due to participation in the creation of c ∈ Ca (t − k). We
normalize this sum utilities by the number of content co-authored
by a at time t − k and further normalized by the time elapsed
k , between content production and evaluation. In our model, to
simplify analysis, we allocate the utility µˆa (t − k) to the maximum
likelihood strategy in Da (t − k).
A rational author r would thus learn the global (i.e., over all
authors) expected utility µ¯д(t , S) for each strategy S ∈ S. Using the
expected value allows us to average out over unobserved confounds
that may co-vary with utility (e.g., author institution; prior author
reputation). Next, we present our experimental results.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we discuss our datasets in Section 5.1, strategy spaces
in Section 5.2, DDAN training in Section 5.3, experiment setting
in Section 5.4, competing baselines in Section 5.5 and evaluation
in Section 5.6. We used XSEDE [37] resources for computation and
our implementations are publicly available 1.
5.1 Datasets
We use the latest version of the DBLP academic dataset [33, 36]. The
goal with this dataset is to discover strategic behavior associated
with two paper attributes: citations and publication venue. That is,
what are the strategic considerations behind whom to cite, and where
to publish? We set papers created during the years 1980–1999 as the
background papers. We aim to examine the strategies adopted by
authors starting from the year 2000 and useG(t) for t ∈ {1, . . . , 19}
to represent the status of the network corresponding to each year
between 2000 and 2018 inclusive. Not every remaining paper in
the dataset contains both citation and location information. We
infer an author or paper’s citation or location strategies only if
we can observe the corresponding citation or location edges. This
corresponds to 97% of the papers.
5.2 Strategy Spaces
Now, we discuss four strategy spaces that alter the distributions of
the attributes. As we discussed in Section 2.2, a bipartite graphGa,c
represents the content production, connecting authors to the con-
tent that they help co-author. One can create using the attributes
of each paper, additional graphs: an author-author citation graph
Ga,a , a paper-paper citation graph Gc,c , a paper-location graph
Gc,u and an author-location graph Ga,u . Since our DDAN is sym-
metric with respect to content and authors, in this section we will
discuss strategic considerations for content (i.e. focus on explaining
Gc,c and Gc,u ); similar arguments hold for authors. Thus, consider
a paper c1 that cites c2 and is published at location u1. We need
to identify strategic considerations that explain the directed edges
(c1, c2) and (c1,u1). We identify four aspects (see Table 2) based
on popularity, similarity of field, familiarity and time recency. As
a reminder, each strategy alters the posterior distributions of the
attribute value, and does not deterministically set the attribute value.
When picking papers to cite, authors may pick highly cited papers,
from similar fields. They may also pick papers by authors whom
1https://github.com/CrowdDynamicsLab/Discovering_Strategic_Behaviors
Aspect Strategy
Popularity s1,0, preferential attachment
s1,1, uniform attachment
Field s2,0, preferring similar fields
s2,1, preferring distinct fields
Familiarity s3,0, preferring familiar nodes
s3,1, preferring unfamiliar nodes
Time s4,0, preferring small time gaps
s4,1, choosing random time gaps
Table 2: Meaning of each pure strategy. Each composite ci-
tation strategy consists of one pure strategy from each of
the four aspects. Each composite location strategy consists
of one pure strategy from each of the first three aspects.
they know (e.g. papers by past co-authors), and if the paper topic
is in a newly emerging area of research, more recent papers.
5.2.1 Popularity. We use two strategies to explain the directed
edge (c1, c2) (and (c1,u1)) based on popularity. The first, is prefer-
ential attachment (i.e., strategy s1,0), documented by Barabási and
Albert [1], where the probability of citing a past paper is propor-
tional to its citations, as the strategy to pick highly cited papers (or
publication venues; for example, authors may want to publish in
journals with high impact factor). The second is to pick papers (or
locations to publish at) uniformly at random (i.e., strategy s1,1).
5.2.2 Field. Weuse LSA [4] to assign each content a 100-dimension
field vector Fc . Then an author’s field vector Fa (t) at time t is the
average of the field vectors of contents that he has created by time t .
A publication venue’s field vector Fu (t) at time t is the average of the
field vectors of contents published there by time t . We perform L2
normalization on all the field vectors. To support their arguments,
authors are likely to cite thematically similar papers (i.e. topic
homophily [16, 21]), or publish in venues with fields similar to the
field of the paper. High-impact papers, on the other hand, often cite
papers outside of their field [38]. Thus, we may explain edge (c1, c2)
either with homophily (i.e., strategy s2,0) or with choosing from
different fields (i.e., strategy s2,1), if the central theme of c1 spans
multiple fields. Thus, we can set the likelihood of edge (c1, c2) based
on strategy s2,0 to be ℓ((c1, c2) | s2,0) ∝ exp(| | − Fc1 − Fc2 | |). The
likelihood of choosing a paper c2 from a field distinct from c1 is just
the complement of ℓ((c1, c2) | s2,0). We make similar arguments for
explaining edge (c1,u1).
5.2.3 Familiarity. Some papersmay preferentially cite other papers
based on authorship; for example, self-citation is a well known
strategy to boost the popular h-index [6, 11]. Thus, we can partition
the set of papers published before time t into two disjoint sets: one
setA that contains papers, each of which has one of the co-authors
of c1 as a co-author. The second set B is the complementary set,
containing papers whose authors do not include any of the co-
authors of paper c1. We can make a parallel argument to partition
the set of past publication venues. Thus in our first familiarity based
strategy s3,0, a paper c1 will cite another c2 with a high probability
if c2 ∈ A and with a low probability if c2 ∈ B. The converse is true
for strategy s3,1.
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Figure 2: (a) DDAN framework applied to snapshot G(t). (b) An illustration of the author-content bipartite graph based on
academic papers. (c) An illustration of the attributes of a content based on academic papers. (d) An example of the social
network in Section 5 when we consider two attributes of content: links to prior contents & publication venues.
5.2.4 Time. Paper citations also exhibit recency bias [8], and thus
time is an important factor for explaining edge (c1, c2). Since content
created at t cannot occur at venues active prior to time t , we do
not include time as a strategic consideration for selecting venue,
that is, to explain edge (c1,u1). To incorporate recency bias (i.e.,
strategy s4,0), we do the following. Assume that the normalized
time difference between the publications c1 and c2 is 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.
Then, to model recency bias, we use a Beta distribution to alter the
posterior probability of selecting papers to cite. That is, likelihood
ℓ((c1, c2) | s4,0) ∝ B(1 − δ | α , β), where α , β are parameters of
the Beta distribution. To model recency, we set α = 10, β = 1. In
the complementary strategy (i.e., strategy s4,1), we pick a paper
uniformly at random with respect to time of publication.
5.2.5 Composite Strategies. Thus far, we discussed four different
strategic considerations to explain edge (c1, c2): popularity, field,
familiarity and time recency. We identify three strategic consider-
ations to explain edge (c1,u1): popularity, field, familiarity. Thus
the likelihood of the edge (c1, c2) is a composite of each of the
four strategies. Since each strategic consideration has two possi-
bilities, we can enumerate 24 = 16 composite strategies to explain
edge (c1, c2). Correspondingly, we can enumerate 23 = 8 composite
strategies to explain edge (c1,u1). A composite citation strategy con-
sists of a pure strategy under each of the four aspects (Popularity,
Field, Familiarity, Time); a composite location strategy consists of a
pure strategy under each of the first three aspects (Popularity, Field,
Familiarity). For easy reference, we use a binary sequence to repre-
sent composite strategies w.r.t. pure strategies (e.g., citation strategy
Sc4 = s1,0 × s2,0 × s3,1 × s4,0, location strategy Sl6 = s1,0 × s2,1 × s3,1).
Then the likelihood of forming an edge e = (c1, c2) given a compos-
ite strategy Si is the product of the likelihoods of forming that edge
given each of Si ’s constituent pure strategies. In this subsection, we
explained the strategic considerations to help explain the formation
of edges (c1, c2) and (c1,u1). We can use the same strategies to help
explain the formation of edges (a1,a2) (i.e., author a1 cites author
a2) and (a1,u1) (i.e., author a1 publishes in venue u1)
5.3 DDAN Training & Optimization
Now, we we discuss how to train and optimize the Dynamic Dual
Attention Networks (DDAN).We first initializeDc andDa (t) as gen-
erated by the flat Dirichlet distribution for content set and authors
active at time t . Then we train the attention networks to update Dc
and Da (t) alternatively by using the current snapshot G(t) as the
ground truth. The overall framework is illustrated in Figure 2. We
need to explain four graphs using DDAN: an author-author cita-
tion graphGa,a , a paper-paper citation graphGc,c , a paper-location
graphGc,u , and an author-location graphGa,u . As a concrete exam-
ple, consider the graph Gc,c . Then, at time t , we need to minimize
the negative log likelihood:
Lc,c (t) =
∑
(ci ,c j )∈Ec,c (t )
− log
∑
Si ∈S
P(Si | Dci ) · ℓ((ci , c j ) | Si ) (10)
Where, P(Si | Dci ) is the probability of picking strategy Si given the
distribution Dci for content ci , and ℓ((ci , c j ) | Si ) is the likelihood
of edge (ci , c j ) given strategy Si . Thus Equation (10) states that we
need to sum over all edges (ci , c j ), the negative log of the likelihood
of observing edge (ci , c j ) conditioned on strategy distribution Dci .
We can construct similar likelihood functions to explain graphs
Ga,a , Gc,u and Ga,u . The overall likelihood is just a sum of the
constituent likelihoods. That is, L(t) = Lc,c (t) + Lc,u (t) + La,a (t) +
La,u (t). Once the DDAN converges in the current snapshot G(t),
we move on to the next snapshot G(t + 1) until all the snapshots
are covered.
5.4 Experiment Settings
To properly evaluate the strategy distributions identified by the
proposed DDAN framework, we apply them to the task of link pre-
diction. Wemodel the link prediction problem as a recommendation
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Snapshot Year |A˜ ′(t)| |A+a (t , j)| |U+a (t , j)|
2000 3,145 31.48 1.34
2005 10,316 42.34 1.47
2010 18,062 57.11 1.50
2015 25,759 82.18 1.56
2018 9,192 109.64 1.41
Table 3: Statistics of the test set. |A˜ ′(t)| is the size of the set of
authors with over five new contents at time t . |A+a (t , j)| and
|U+a (t , j)| are the average sizes of the positive testing sets per
author per fold at time t when we examine the citation and
publication strategies, respectively.
problem which aims to rank node pairs in terms of the posterior
probability of forming an edge between them. That is, the identified
strategy distributions should best explain the observed network.
We identify the set of authors A˜ ′(t) with over five new contents in
the current snapshot G(t) and partition each author’s contents for
5-fold cross validation. For each fold Ca (t , j) where j ∈ {1, . . . , 5},
we hide the author-content edges between a and c ∈ Ca (t , j) as well
as the edges between a and attribute nodes A+a (t , j) andU+a (t , j)
formed due to c ∈ Ca (t , j). The model is trained using the remain-
ing network and aims to recover the hidden attribute edges. Since
exhaustive computation over all node pairs is expensive, we uti-
lize the information of a’s coauthors when creating c ∈ Ca (t , j).
The authors cited by those co-authors and the venues where those
coauthors have made publications by time t constitute the negative
testing sets A−a (t , j) andU−a (t , j), respectively. We apply this pro-
cess on the DBLP dataset with a five-year gap (i.e., we only look at
snapshots corresponding to Year 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2018).
We summarize these statistics in Table 3. We use Mean Average
Precision (MAP) as the evaluation metric.
5.5 Baselines
We want to point out that the problem of identifying authors’ strat-
egy distributions can also be modeled by topic generative models.
Therefore, we compare our DDAN framework against two different
topic models [41, 45] and one traditional regression model [13]. For
static models [13, 45], we apply the model to each testing snapshot
separately. For dynamic models [41] and DDAN, we first obtain
the history information with the entire dataset, and then apply the
model to the training sets in each testing snapshot.
(1) Logistic Regression (LR) [13]: When applying the logistic
regression model on each author individually, we treat the
likelihood of forming an edge as the predictor and the ground
truth as the response variable. The coefficients in the regres-
sion model are constrained to be non-negative and sum to 1
so that they can be interpreted as strategy distributions.
(2) DirichletMultinomialMixtureModel (DMM) [45]:Words
become strategies and topics over words become distribu-
tions over strategies. Authors need to pick one strategy from
their strategy distributions to form an edge. We set the num-
ber of topics to be the same as the number of strategies
so that each topic is initialized with a maximum likelihood
strategy. All the authors in each testing snapshot are trained
together to detect their strategy distributions.
(3) Topics Over Time (TOT) [41]: In comparison with DMM,
TOT requires authors to first choose a topic from her distri-
bution over topics in that snapshot and then pick a strategy
from the chosen topic to form an edge. Meanwhile, each
topic is also associated with a continuous distribution over
time snapshots.
(4) DDAN: The proposed framework which models individuals’
content production strategies under the influence of social
interactions involved in the process.
5.6 Evaluation
Each model is tested using 5-fold cross-validation, and the aver-
age MAP scores are reported in Table 4. We can see that DDAN
outperforms the rest for both strategies in all snapshots. LR per-
forms slightly better than DMM since LR is trained on each author
individually, while the training of DMM requires the entire set
of active authors and may involve some noises. Meanwhile, dy-
namic models (DDAN, TOT) also give better results than static
models (LR, DMM) since dynamic models consider the connection
across snapshots. In general, unlike the baseline models (LR, DMM,
TOT) which focus on authors’ information and ignore the social
context, the proposed DDAN framework comprehensively models
the interactions between authors and contents within the same
snapshot, as well as the dependencies between the present and the
past. Therefore, DDAN achieves the highest performance. In this
section, we introduced four strategic considerations—popularity,
field, familiarity, and time—to explain the existence of an edge in
four different derived graphs from the DBLP dataset. We also cov-
ered DDAN training and reported experimental results comparing
DDAN with state-of-the-art baselines. The goal of these baselines
was to understand if DDAN modeled the observations well. Next,
we present a qualitative analysis of our results.
6 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
Two questions in Section 2.2 motivated us: if the preference or-
der amongst strategies stabilizes for individuals (thus indicating
Year Strategies LR [13] DMM [45] TOT [41] DDAN
2000 Citation 0.72 0.72 0.73 0.74Publication 0.71 0.70 0.73 0.75
2005 Citation 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.71Publication 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.73
2010 Citation 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69Publication 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.74
2015 Citation 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69Publication 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.75
2018 Citation 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.69Publication 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.78
Table 4: Experiment results using Mean Average Precision
(MAP) as the evaluationmetrics. DDAN achieves the highest
scores for both strategies in all testing snapshots.
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Figure 3: The figures show the distribution of utilities for the citation and location strategy spaces (i.e., (a) and (b)) and the plot
of strategy preference order correlation as a function of where authors are in their career (i.e., (c)). Figures (a) and (b) show that
different strategies yield different outcomes and that some authors (∼ 7%) do better than the rational agent who maximizes
expected utility. Figure (c) shows that only the top 10% of the authors’ preference order begins to stabilize throughout their
career. A majority (∼ 75%) of authors do not stabilize in their strategy preference order.
the emergence of strategic behavior) and if these stable preference
orders are correlated with high utility. As a reminder, stable pref-
erence orders may not correlate to high payoffs—since individuals
are resource-limited, they may lack the resources to discover the
correlation between behavior and payoff. Instead, stability may
arise due to other factors, including social norms. Let us examine
each question in turn. In the analysis that follows, we use the same
strategy spaces and payoffs introduced in the previous section: the
authors in an academic social network make decisions on whom
to cite, and where to publish. We used sixteen citation strategies
and eight location strategies. Since we use the academic dataset,
we use the number of citations as the content utility, that is, µc (k)
refers to the number of citations c received over k time units after
publication. We assume for this analysis that citation strategies (i.e.,
which papers to cite) and location strategies (i.e., where to publish)
are independent and contribute equally to the content utility µc (k).
6.1 Do strategies matter?
Let us first examine if there are any differences amongst the strate-
gies S ∈ S. Consider Figure 3 (a)-(b). The two figures show the
distribution of maximum likelihood utilities over the citation and
location strategy space for the whole population. Observe that the
utility curves in each sub-figure are distinct: each strategy distri-
bution has a different mode, and some strategies have a higher
payoff. Consider Figure 3 (b), the distribution of location strate-
gies. It shows that location strategy 0, i.e., Sl0, has the maximum
modal payoff (i.e., the distribution with the highest mode). This
strategy says that the authors pick venues based on preferential
attachment (that is, pick venues in proportion to their publication
popularity), that are from similar fields as the author, and that are
familiar (i.e., the author has published there earlier). In hindsight,
this is intuitive—by publishing in popular venues, there is an in-
creasing likelihood that their papers will be visible, with similar
fields, there is an increasing chance that the paper is more likely to
be accepted due to topical match, and if the author has published
there previously, then the author understands the social norms in
terms of how to write for that audience, again increasing the chance
of acceptance. Figure 3 (a), the distribution of citation strategies
offers similar insights. It shows that citation strategy 2, 4 and 15,
i.e. Sc2 , S
c
4 and S
c
15, have the highest modal utilities. Let us examine
strategy 4, i.e. Sc4 , in detail; the insights for the other two follow a
similar argument. Sc4 says that authors cite papers based on prefer-
ential attachment (i.e., they cite highly cited papers), from similar
fields (i.e., they cite papers similar to their own paper), pick papers
that are not familiar (that is, they don’t cite their own papers), and
pick most recent papers. This strategy of picking papers that are
well cited in their own field makes sense—it is less likely that their
paper will be rejected for inadequate references; that they don’t
self-cite is also reasonable since excessive self-citation is frowned
upon, and citing more recent papers implies that they have covered
all the recent, relevant works in their area.
6.2 Emergence of Order
Having established that the strategies have different payoffs, let us
examine if authors begin to converge on a preferential order over
strategies. In our DDAN formulation, each author a has a strategy
distribution Da (t), for each time t . We compute the preference or-
der, by utilizing the likelihood of the strategy, for the citation and
location strategies for each author. Then, we compute the Spear-
man rank correlation coefficient [23], to compute the correlation
in preference order across consecutive publication years, for all
authors with at least five publication years. Then, to aggregate
across authors, we group rank correlation coefficients in relation to
the author career length. Figure 3 (c) shows the rank correlation
curves. The curves show that the correlations increase for those
authors with the normalized utility in the top 10%, with the highest
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Figure 4: For authors who published in at least 15 years, Fig-
ure (a) shows the distribution of their citation strategies in
the 1st, 5th, 10th and 15th year. Figure (b) is the correspond-
ing distribution of their citation utilities. Similar heatmaps
are drawn for location strategies in Figure (c) and (d).
increases for those in the top 1%. What the curves imply for the
top 1% is that this group quickly converge onto the citation and
location strategy, while for the group in the top 1 − 10% converge
onto the citation strategy (but less quickly than do the top 1%), but
takes a while for them to figure out where to publish. What is of
note: authors in the bottom 90% in terms of the normalized utility
are less likely to be correlated in terms of their citation or location
strategy. Figure 4 shows the strategy distributions for both citation
and location strategy spaces, over time, for authors who have pub-
lished in at least 15 years (there are 23,238 of them). Notice that over
time, for this group of authors, one can see that citation strategy
2, 4, 6 and 15, i.e., Sc2 , S
c
4 , S
c
6 and S
c
15, are beginning to stabilize and
location strategy 0, i.e., Sl0, is stabilizing; notice that the correspond-
ing utilities are also high; these plots indicate that for many of
these authors, a preference order emerges. Notice in Figure 3 (a)-(b),
we find somewhat surprisingly, that a small percentage of authors
(∼ 7%) have the normalized utility greater than the rational agent.
This is reasonable because the rational agent computes the expected
payoff of any strategy; there will be some authors for whom that a
strategy works better than average. In other words, some authors
appear better than the rational agent, because most authors never
figure out the correct strategy, depressing the mean.
6.3 Stability and Payoffs
Having established the emergence of a stable preference order for
some of the authors, it is natural to ask if this order is correlated
with expected utilities. That is, do the preferences over strategies
match the utilities that accrue from using them? We examine this
issue in Figure 5. The plots show the marginal strategy distribution
for the top 1% of the authors in terms of their normalized utility,
with the top-left sub-figure showing the marginal citation strategy
(a)
(c)
(b)
(d)
Figure 5: For authors with top 1% normalized utilities, we
show the distribution over their citation strategies in Figure
(a) and over citation utilities in Figure (b). Similar distribu-
tions are drawn for location strategies in Figure (c) and (d).
High utility of citation strategy 6 in 5(a) and 5(b) is notable:
this strategy emphasizes citing papers from different fields.
This is consistent with findings by Uzzi et al. [38] that high-
impact papers tend to cite papers from different fields.
distribution, and the top right sub-figure showing the correspond-
ing utility distribution. Notice that again, citation strategy 2, 4, 6
and 15, i.e. Sc2 , S
c
4 , S
c
6 and S
c
15, have the highest utility values. While
strategy 6 does not have the same high mode as strategy 2, 4 and 15
from Figure 3, those authors at the top 1% derive more utility from
it than most other authors. The main difference between strategy 4
and strategy 6: strategy 6, consistent with work by Uzzi et al. [38]
on publications with high-impact, emphasizes citing highly cited
papers from different fields. At the same time, strategy 4 suggests
that we pick highly cited papers from the same field. A similar
pattern emerges for location strategy—strategy 0 being the strategy
with the highest payoff for the top 1% is consistent with the findings
from Figure 3 (b). In this section, we qualitatively examined the
questions that motivated this paper: the emergence of preference
order, and the relationship between preference order and utility. In
the case of the academic dataset, and for the citation and location
strategy spaces, we observe the emergence of order. Interestingly,
we see that preference order is stable only for the top 10% of the in-
dividuals in our dataset. Furthermore, we find that the preferences
of the top 1% are correlated with utility.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss key ideas and limitations. Below we
discuss critical comments: model generalizability, strategy space,
and use of one social network dataset.
Types of content-production : Our framework applies to con-
tent production scenarioswith discrete strategy spaces.While
the framework applies to the case when there is a mix of
single-authored and collaboratively-authored documents,
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the proposed dual attention networks make the most sense
in the case when the content has multiple authors, for exam-
ple in venues such as academic citation networks and online
forums such as Piazza.
Generalization to other networks: Each social network has
a different strategy space (the set of possible actions, reward
mechanism—mapping actions to utility), social norms, and
the network structure (bipartite person and content graph).
Thus, interpreting the results of our framework on each so-
cial network requires care. This paper discusses results only
from the DBLP dataset. We do have results from StackEx-
change data, where we assumed that the participants collab-
orated in creating the set of answers, with user reputation as
the payoff. The strategy space for StackExchange included,
among others, what questions to answer, which users to
follow.
Since this is the first paper on discovering strategic behaviors
from networks, we felt that it was essential to perform a qual-
itative analysis of the discovered behaviors (Section 6), and
not restrict ourselves to a link prediction task (Section 5.6, Ta-
ble 4). It is the qualitative analysis that provides a more
in-depth understanding (emergence of order; connections
between order and payoffs) of behavior. We lacked space in
the paper to describe the strategy space for StackExchange
(different from DBLP) and perform a careful qualitative anal-
ysis of the StackExchange results. We plan to report these
results in an extended ArXiv paper.
Limitations: We state two limitations here. First, for each so-
cial network, we require a specific set of strategies and a
utility function. Identification of a complete strategy space
may be non-trivial for some networks. Second, our rational
model is myopic; instead, we could use an explore-exploit
strategy in the vein of reinforcement learning literature.
8 RELATEDWORK
Our approach targets strategic behavior modeling in social net-
works via dual graph attention. We provide a brief overview of
related past work.
Strategic Behavior Modeling in Social Networks. Social be-
havior modeling is connected to a wide range of past work: Papage-
lis et al. [25] investigates how individual behavior is affected by
those of her friends; Kohli et al. [15] looks at how social relations
affect players’ strategies in a resource allocation game. Others tar-
get specific scenarios: Xu et al. [44] studies users’ posting behavior
on Twitter; Irfan and Gordon [14] includes behavioral context in
its model of congressional voting; and more recent work models
relation types [24, 28] and social influence [17, 30] in neural recom-
mendation frameworks; Dong et al. [5] discovers social strategies
among mobile users. Some general frameworks are also proposed:
Mueller-Frank [22] formally characterizes rational learning in so-
cial networks. In contrast to past work, we examine if strategic
behaviors emerge among social content producers to maximize
social rewards.
Graph Attention Networks. With recent advancements in
graph neural networks [43, 46, 47] and attention mechanisms [18,
39], GAT [40] introduces the attention mechanism in network fea-
ture aggregation by implicitly prioritizing node neighbors. Several
works attempt to extend GAT to dynamic versions: combining re-
current neural networks with GAT [34]; combined attention on
structural neighborhood and temporal dynamics [29] and node-
aware attention for user interaction predictions in real-world dy-
namic graphs [26]. Wu et al. [42] uses user-specific and dynamic
context-aware attention weights for social recommendation. In con-
trast, our proposed DDAN framework extracts latent strategies via
forward-backward dual attention to model the social interactions
centered on content and authors.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the question of whether resource-
limited individuals were able to discover strategic behaviors associ-
ated with high payoffs when producing content in social networks.
Empirical analysis is challenging since while we do observe the ac-
tion, and the payoff, we do not observe the strategic considerations
underlying the action. Our technical insight was to conceptualize
the observed behavior as a generative process. That is, a strategic
decision changes the posterior distribution over the action space.
We assumed that while the set of strategies is common to all, each
individual randomizes over the set of strategies. We proposed a
novel framework of Dynamic Dual Attention Networks (DDAN) to
model authors’ strategic behaviors when creating contents in social
networks. We made three strong empirical findings: first, different
strategies lead to different payoffs; second, the group of authors
with the highest 10% normalized utility exhibit stability in their
preferential orders over strategies, which indicates the emergence
of strategic behaviors; third, the stability of preference is related to
high payoffs. While our technical insight is generalizable, adapting
our framework to other social networks requires care: the strategy
spaces of these networks may differ, and if the content-production
is not collaborative, DDAN may not be the best approach.
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